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Does Gentrification Lower Crime: A Look at Granger-Casuality in Washington, D.C.
Abstract
This project looks at the relationship between gentrification and violent crime rates, specifically in
Washington, DC. Gentrification is a social phenomenon that involves middle and upper class residents
moving into the city center where violent crime had previously acted as a barrier for keeping unwanted
demographics out. An increase in demand for housing by the higher income residents drives up the cost
of housing which, in turn, forces out the lower income residents. Higher income residents generally have
lower crime rates, so the crime rate falls as the lower income residents with higher crime rates move.
This, however, is all theory. This study explores whether crime rates fall as a result of these upper income
families moving in or if the drop in crime is one more reason the upper income residents want to move.
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Does Gentrification Lower Crime: A Look at
Granger-Casuality in Washington, D.C.
Will Lawrence
I.INTRODUCTION
Driving through Washington, D.C. today is
noticeably different from twenty years ago. In the
1980s and early 1990s, the crack epidemic took hold of
Washington D.C. and in 1991, the murder rate peaked
at 479 deaths (NBC4 Washington, 2011). Since then,
crime has plummeted and investment in the povertystricken areas is on the rise. According to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, from 1995 until 2010, the
violent crime rate in Washington, D.C. fell by more
than half from 2,661.4 per 100,000 individuals in 1995
to 1,330.2 per 100,000 in 2010 (FBI, 1995, 2011).
During that same timeframe, the median housing price
(2010 $) rose three-fold from $176,000 to $528,000
(NeighborhoodInfo DC, 2011). These astonishing
changes are not a mere coincidence. There is a definite
social phenomenon called ‘gentrification’ occurring in
the nation’s capital.
This project looks at the relationship between
gentrification and violent crime rates, specifically in
Washington, DC. Gentrification is a social phenomenon
that involves middle and upper class residents
moving into the city center where violent crime had
previously acted as a barrier for keeping unwanted
demographics out. An increase in demand for housing
by the higher income residents drives up the cost of
housing which, in turn, forces out the lower income
residents. Higher income residents generally have
lower crime rates, so the crime rate falls as the lower
income residents with higher crime rates move. This,
however, is all theory. This study explores whether
crime rates fall as a result of these upper income
families moving in or if the drop in crime is one more
reason the upper income residents want to move.
II. THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW
As gentrification is a pressing phenomenon,
large amounts of literature have been devoted to it, and
more specifically, its relationship with crime. McDonald
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(1986) provides somewhat of a literature review, albeit
a dated one, of the competing theories regarding the
effects of gentrification. McDonald (1986) characterizes
gentrification as “the apparent revitalization of central
city private housing markets”. An important distinction
that must be made in that definition is the existence of
a population shift. Simply upgrading the housing supply
by long-term residents does not qualify as gentrification.
There has to be a movement of middle and upper-class
people into what was formerly a predominately lowerclass neighborhood.
While it may seem that this ‘revitalization’ will
be a positive influence on neighborhoods, the theory
is not so cut-and-dry. In Fairmount, a neighborhood of
Philadelphia that previously had strong ethnic bonds,
upper class residents with different cultural norms moved
in and led to direct conflict escalating into violence with
the lower class, long-term residents (McDonald, 1986,
p. 167). That being said, this is usually rare because of
how strong the ethnic and cultural bonds need to be.
A potpourri of different cultures living together simply
because of lower housing costs is not enough for this
to occur. Rather, it is more in line with the districts of
Chinatown and Little Italy in New York City.
McDonald (1986) outlines five potential
reasons why crime rates drop with gentrification and
four potential reasons why they might rise, along with
one reason why it might stay stagnate. The reasons they
might drop are as follows: (1) affluent neighborhoods
have, on average, less crime than impoverished
neighborhoods, (2) revitalization at the hands of the
new residents can “pull up” instead of “push out” the
former residents, (3) new residents are more cognizant
of the crime problem and establish initiatives to combat
crime, for example, the neighborhood watch, (4)
affluent residents usually have more political influence
which leads to more funding devoted to the police
department, more stringent stances on crime, etc., and
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(5) the displacement of the poor residents can lead to
the individuals responsible for committing the crimes
to be displaced. Reason five is what gets at the heart
of gentrification and is directly related to, if not the
cause of, reason one. Reasons two, three, and four are
periphery causes of the drop in crime, at least in the
context of a model of gentrification.
On the other hand, McDonald (1986) also
gives several reasons why gentrification might not
lead to a decrease in crime: (1) when individuals are
displaced, they may only be displaced to adjacent blocks
or neighborhoods which hardly prevents them from
committing crime in their old neighborhood, especially
with an influx of attractive targets, (2) if gentrification is
drawn out over a long period of time, there will be a very
apparent income-gap between residents which suggests
an increase in violent crime, (3) gentrification in ‘cohesive
ethnic neighborhoods’ rather than ‘disorganized ghetto
neighborhoods’ may lead to the breakdown of natural
order in the communities, (4) gentrification can cause
community conflicts which, on some occasions, results
in criminal activity, and (5) it may not have any effect at
all. Most of these theorized effects occur at the onset
of gentrification. As time goes on, it appears that the
end-result of a fully gentrified neighborhood will have
lower crime rates.
Much research use case-studies to look at
individual neighborhoods (McDonald, 1986; O’Sullivan,
2005; Kreager et al, 2011). This paper is different in that
it examines the city-wide effect of gentrification. By
using data from every neighborhood in a city, regression
analysis can be employed to explore the effects of
gentrification. Unfortunately, by not focusing on specific
neighborhoods, this paper cannot examine the specific
reasons gentrification affects crime rates. Instead, it
will focus on the gentrification process as it permeates
throughout a city.
This paper employs location theory to look at
the general effects of gentrification on crime. Location
theory states that in a completely un-gentrified city, the
city center is high in crime with a low income residential
population while the suburbs around the city with low
crime rates are populated by higher income people
who commute into the city. O’Sullivan’s (2005) model
of location theory holds that as the cost of travel into
the city center goes up and the cost of security in the
city center goes down, the higher income people will
move into the center of the city to take advantage of
the cheap housing and low travel costs. As the higher

income population moves in, they push out the lower
income population and the crime rate should fall
further due to a variety of factors that McDonald
covered previously. The lower income population gets
pushed out because while they also value the low
travel expenses that are a result of living close to the
center of the city, the higher income population is able
to outbid the lower income population in order to
take advantage of the convenience. The lower income
population will be pushed out, starting from the center,
to the edges of the city. Once the gentrification process
is complete, they will ultimately move elsewhere. Rising
travel costs for the upper income population in addition
to less crime in the center of the city, based on location
theory’s explanation of gentrification, will ultimately lead
to higher housing costs and a further reduction of crime.
A Granger-causality Test is used in order to
examine the relationship between gentrification and
crime. A Granger Test attempts to show causality
between two variables, although it is closer to an
inference than a conclusive finding. The idea behind
the Granger Test is that if an independent variable ‘X’
combined with lags for a dependent variable can give a
better estimate of the dependant variable ‘Y’ than just
the lags, X is said to have ‘Granger-caused’ Y. Specifics of
running the test will further be explored in the outline
of the empirical model.
The hypothesis states that gentrification will
Granger-cause crime rates to go down, at least in
Washington, D.C, but crime rates will not Grangercause gentrification. While location theory holds that
both the crime rates are going down as well as travel
costs are going up which causes gentrification, this
study examines if D.C. is a unique case. Washington,
D.C. has the second worst traffic among US cities
(Weather.com). Washington D.C. is a high commuter
city with the limited upper class neighborhood options
concentrated in a very small area. A large population
works in Washington D.C. but commutes every day, as
evidenced by the fact that the population of Washington
D.C. almost doubles during the workday according to
the 2000 Census. This study, therefore, has important
policy implications for the city of Washington D.C. If
gentrification is a socially desirable outcome, it would
be beneficial for the government in Washington D.C.
to allow travel costs to rise to encourage gentrification.
On the other hand, if gentrification is undesirable, it
would be more efficient to subsidize travel so that the
upper income population stays in the suburbs and does
not displace the lower income population in the city.
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In the context of this study, it is possible for crime
to Granger-cause gentrification just as gentrification
Granger-causes crime. If this occurs, this study will be
forced to conclude that the two variables are working
simultaneously and the causal factors cannot be brought
out. If neither gentrification nor crime Granger-cause
the other, then the two variables are unrelated.
III. DATA
This study uses data directly from the
Metropolitan Police Department’s (MPD) Research and
Analysis Branch. Washington D.C. has several different
divisions including quadrants (NW, SE, etc.), wards (18), police districts (1-7), and police service areas (PSAs)
(within each police district). Quadrants, police districts,
and wards are all too large areas to approximate the
effect of individual neighborhoods. Another problem
is there are not enough data points to get significant
results. Even with wards, 8 wards and 6 years (20042010) only yield 48 observations. Because of the
Granger-causality Test, lagging variables take even more
observations away.Therefore, this study uses PSAs, both
to combat a small sample size and to attempt to get
at neighborhood differences. Ideally, this study would
examine data going back to 1995, or when the crack
epidemic of the late 1980s and early 1990s was winding
down. Unfortunately, MPD was not comfortable
releasing data prior to 2004 due to reporting and
geographic inconsistencies. In order to get the prior
data, a FOIA request is necessary, which leads to a
natural continuation of this research. Going back to only
2004 will yield a large enough sample size to conduct
a regression analysis, but it is unlikely to show as strong
of a correlation between crime and gentrification.
Because gentrification is a process, only six years
might not be enough to show the process happening.
This study also uses data from a website called
NeighborhoodInfoDC.com which is a source that pulls
together data from a variety of sources including the DC
Department of Human Services and the D.C. Office of
Tax and Revenue’s Real Property Tax Administration’s
real property database. From this website, the average
property values as well as Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) for each individual PSA will
be used. Property values are used as a proxy for one
side of gentrification: the upper class residents moving
in. TANF will be used as a proxy for the other side
of gentrification: the lower classes moving out. TANF
is a means-tested government subsidy so the more
individuals receiving TANF implies that there is a higher
population of poor people. If gentrification is occurring,
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an increase in housing prices, accompanied with a fall
in individuals receiving TANF, will show that crime rates
are falling.
In 2004, Washington, D.C. redrew the lines
for the Police Service Areas. Unfortunately, the data
from the Metropolitan Police Department were
coded for the post-2004 PSAs while the data from
NeighborhoodInfoDC.com were coded for the pre2004 PSAs. While this certainly detracts from the
credibility of the data, it does not completely undermine
the study. The police districts have not changed. So
while the districts may have been slightly different, the
neighborhoods still have much overlap.The biggest issue
is that in the redistricting, two new PSAs were created.
Because this study cannot accurately redistribute the
crime data from the new PSAs to the old ones, those
data points have been omitted. Due to the same overall
police districts and the two omitted PSAs, there should
not be significant errors in the analysis.
Due to the limited scope of this project, the effect
of traffic will not be examined. While it is an important
effect with regards to location theory, the other half
of the location theory still warrants a treatment. An
increase in housing prices implies that there is a higher
demand for houses in neighborhoods with high crime
rates, which accounts for the gentrification. In addition,
looking at the effects of gentrification (the smaller
number of lower income people proxied by the TANF
measure) can also be fruitful. A continuation of this paper
would incorporate traffic and attempt to show that
traffic Granger-causes gentrification, although the exact
method for conducting that test is not overtly apparent.
IV. EMPRICIAL MODEL
The empirical model in this paper follows the
Granger-causality Test. Two separate Granger-causality
tests will be run: one with housing as the independent
variable and the other with TANF as the independent
variable. To begin, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regression is run to see the correlation between the
dependent variable (crime) and the independent
variables (housing or poverty), as well as a variable for
lagged crime. The number of violent crimes related
to the city-wide mean will be CRIME. HOUSE is the
median house price for the individual PSA. TANF is the
number of individuals receiving the subsidy as related to
the city-wide mean. This takes the following form:
CRIME = ß0 + ß1HOUSE + ß2CRIMEt-1
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Next, the variable ‘HOUSE’ is removed yielding the
following equation:
CRIME = ß0 + ß1CRIMEt-1
Finally, a Wald test is done between the two regressions.
The first equation with housing included is the
unrestricted model.The second model with the HOUSE
variable omitted is the restricted model. An F-test is
then run to determine if the omission of HOUSE had a
statistically significant effect on the prediction of CRIME.
The F-statistic is as follows:
F = (ESSR – ESSU)/(DFR – DFU)
ESSU/DFU
Where ESS is the Error Sum of Squares for the
respective restricted and unrestricted models and DF
is the Degrees of Freedom for the respective restricted
and unrestricted models. If the F-test is significant, then
it can be said that HOUSE ‘Granger-caused’ CRIME.
The test then needs to be run again to
determine if CRIME ‘Granger-causes’ HOUSE. It will
look exactly the same as the first Granger-causality Test
except the initial setup will look as follows:
HOUSE = ß0 + ß1CRIME + ß2HOUSEt-1
HOUSE = ß0 + ß1HOUSEt-1
The F-test is then run to determine if CRIME ‘Grangercaused’ HOUSE. The hypothesis is HOUSE will
‘Granger-cause’ CRIME to fall but CRIME will have no
effect on HOUSE in terms of Granger-causality. This is
in accordance with the location theory as previously
articulated.
The previous test is then run again with
the variable TANF in place of the variable HOUSE.
Equations 1 to5 are followed and the methodology is
exactly the same.
V. RESULTS
In order to simplify the Granger-causality Tests,
only one variable at a time is introduced . This results in
two separate Granger Tests, one for housing prices and
the other for TANF. These two tests get at both sides
of the gentrification process: the former is a proxy for
the upper income residents moving in and the latter is a
proxy for the lower income residents moving out.

To start, two regressions are run: the first
regression is HOUSE on CRIME and the second
regression is TANF on CRIME. This is done to check
both the coefficients and the signs. As a Granger Test
only examines Granger-causality, the coefficients and
signs are irrelevant. Table 1 shows the first regression
with HOUSE is significant at the .01 level, has the
correct sign, and a coefficient of -.287.Table 2 shows the
second regression with TANF also is significant at the
.01 level, has the correct sign, and a coefficient of .150.
The reason for running the two regressions separately
was that the variables have high multicollinearity. Since
both housing prices and TANF numbers are directly
related (lower income residents have lower housing
prices), including both HOUSE and TANF in the same
regression with crime is not productive.
Table 3 shows the first Granger Test examined,
CRIME and HOUSE. As previously explained, HOUSE
and CRIMEt-1 are regressed on CRIME in the unrestricted
model. Then, CRIMEt-1 is regressed on CRIME in the
restricted model. The resulting F-value comparing the
restricted and the unrestricted models is 39.94 which
is statistically significant at the .01 level. Next, CRIME
and HOUSEt-1 are regressed on HOUSE. Then, CRIME
is taken out and HOUSEt-1 is regressed on HOUSE.
The resulting F-value is 102.68, which is also statistically
significant at the .01 level. From these results, HOUSE
Granger-causes CRIME and CRIME Granger-causes
HOUSE.
Table 4 shows the second Granger Test
which repeats the above test, this time examining the
relationship between TANF and CRIME.The unrestricted
model involves regressing TANF and CRIMEt-1 on CRIME
while the unrestricted model excludes TANF and only
has a regression of CRIMEt-1 on CRIME. The resulting
F-value was 36.6, which is statistically significant at the
.01 level. The process is then reversed with CRIME and
TANFt-1 having a regression on TANF in the unrestricted
model. CRIME is then excluded from the restricted
model and the resulting F-value was 6.3, which due to
the high sample size is significant at the .01 level. From
this, it can be shown that TANF Granger-causes CRIME
and CRIME Granger-causes TANF.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
From the results, the effects of gentrification can
clearly be seen. The individual regressions show that an
increase in housing price and a decrease in the number
of poor people will each lead to a decrease in crime.
That being said, the goal of this project is not to merely
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note the existence of gentrification. Rather, it is to show
a potential causal relationship between the proxies for
gentrification and the effects of the gentrification.
The two Granger Tests yielded the same result:
both examined variables Granger-caused the other. This
essentially means that the variables influence each other,
preventing any causal conclusions from being drawn.
While there is no one way Granger-causality, these
results still allow some inferences to be made.
It is worth looking at the TANF Granger Test
a little more closely. The F-statistic for the first half of
the Granger Test to determine if TANF Granger-causes
CRIME was 36.6, which is statistically significant at the
.01 level. The F-statistic for the second half of the test
was merely 6.3, but is also statistically significant at the
.01 level due to the large sample size. Because the F-test
is designed to examine the difference between two
regressions, the large difference in magnitude between
the two F-statistics may lead one to believe that there is
a difference. While conclusions cannot be drawn given
that they are both statistically significant, it appears that
TANF may Granger-cause CRIME to a higher degree
than CRIME Granger-causes TANF.
One possible reason why no conclusive
Granger-causality results were drawn is that the data
only went back to 2005. Because the Metropolitan Police
Department did not grant access to earlier data, the
entire process of gentrification could not be examined.
One important aspect of gentrification on a city-wide
level is that it is an ongoing process. In Washington,
D.C., the process started in the early 1990s with the
end of the crack epidemic. Without including almost a
decade’s worth of data, it is hardly a surprise that the
results are not exactly what are expected. Once the
entire gentrification process is contained in the data, the
results might be more in line with what is hypothesized.
Even without Granger-causality one way or the
other, this study still has merit. In short, it served as a
confirmation of one side of location theory. A fall in
crime rates does lead to the occurrence of gentrification.
While the traffic side has not been accounted for, it is an
area for additional research. Washington, D.C., at least
according to the results in this study, is simply another
example of location theory at work.
Unfortunately, without any Granger-causality
to build from (aside from the weak inference with
the TANF results), it is not as easy to make policy
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implications. That being said, this information can be
useful for city planning. If gentrification is a desired
outcome, governments should allow traffic costs to rise
(assuming the traffic side of location theory still holds)
as well as combating crime in the inner-city. This brings
up an entirely new debate, however, about whether or
not gentrification is, in fact, desired. There is a difference
between pushing lower income people out and pulling
them up into a better social standing. It appears that
gentrification is guilty of the former, although this area
deserves more research. If this is the case, it is difficult
to see gentrification as anything more than a geographic
redistribution of the indigent; a hardly desirable outcome
when it comes to social justice.
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VIII. APPENDIX

Table 1: Preliminary Housing Regresion
Vairable
Explanation
Dependent Variable
CRIME
Number of crimes in a given year
Independent Variable
HOUSE
Median house sale for a given year
2
Adjusted R
.030

Coefficient

Significance

-.287
Sample Size

-.2900(***)
243

Table 2: Preliminary Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Regression
Variable
Explanation
Coefficicent
Dependent Variable
CRIME
Number of total crimes in a given year
Independent Variable
TANF

Number of individuals receiving Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families
2
Adjusted R
.143

Table 3: HOUSE Granger Test
Variable
HOUSE
CRIMEt-1
Error Sum of Squares
Sample Size
F-Statistic
CRIME
HOUSEt-1
Error Sum of Squares
Sample Size
F-Statistic

Unrestricted
-.009 (-.396)
.974 (64.971)***
1632386
206
39.94***
-.012 (-1.346)
.966 (64.014)***
598383
201
102.68***
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Significance

.150

6.627(***)

Sample Size

257

Restricted
.975 (71.994)***
1953531
257

.959 (58.928)***
907136
207
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Table 4: TANF Granger Test
Variable
TANF
CRIMEt-1
Error Sum of Squares
Sample Size
F-Statistic
CRIME
TANFt-1
Error Sum of Squares
Sample Size
F-Statistic

92

Unrestricted
.013 (2.230)**
.964 (64.240)***
1673740
220
36.6***
-.043 (-2.460)**
.999 (144.045)***
2071699
215
6.3***
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Restricted
.975 (71.994)***
1953531
257

.993 (160.756)***
2132402
224

